Is disarmament dead? There are nine nuclear armed nations. All of them continue to invest in the maintenance and improvement of their arsenals. Fifty-six years ago, when the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force, five of those nations promised the rest of the world they would eventually get rid of them. If justice delayed is justice denied, how much longer should the non-nuclear states wait?
On April 27, the 191 nations who are parties to the NPT sent representatives to the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York to confer for almost a month. I took three trips to Midtown Manhattan to interview NPT participants at the beginning, in the middle and near the end of their discussions. All expressed a pessimism that was justified by the outcome. The nuclear weapons states thwarted every effort to hold them accountable. I was happy the non-nuclear weapons states refused to agree to a final document that would have made this injustice appear acceptable.
Iran and Ukraine
The wars in Iran and Ukraine significantly influenced the discussions. Both are non-nuclear nations that were attacked by nuclear-armed aggressors. Both were given assurances by the five NPT nuclear weapons states that they would never threaten to attack a non-nuclear member state with nuclear weapons. No fair interpretation of the public statements and media discourse of the aggressors could claim those assurances were honored. The lesson for the rest of the non-nuclear world seems clear. Binding legal commitments from nuclear weapons states mean the least when they matter the most.
And yet, the nuclear taboo held. Not because of the NPT, or international diplomacy, but because there is something intangible about nuclear weapons that, since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, prevented them from being used again. Moreover, the non-nuclear states are, for the moment, defeating their nuclear-armed aggressors on the battlefield. If they prevail when the fighting stops, and the wars officially end, these outcomes may contribute more to nuclear nonproliferation than the treaty their nuclear aggressors failed to honor. Small and medium-sized states with limited defense budgets may be better off investing in cheap drones than in expensive empty threats.
The umbrella states
The most disappointing group of nations attending the conference was the small collection of non-nuclear armed US allies who imagine they enjoy some sort of benefit from the US nuclear arsenal. Shortly after his inauguration in 1969, President Richard Nixon famously told his national security council that the idea there was a nuclear umbrella that covered these allies was “a lot of crap.” Whether any US president would be willing to risk a retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States to aid an allied nation has always been an open and unanswerable question, which may be why there is no explicit nuclear use commitment included in any US mutual defense agreement.
In exchange for this imaginary protection these “umbrella states” consistently work with the nuclear weapons states to thwart efforts by the rest of the non-nuclear world to make the NPT a more effective legal instrument. The most disappointing of all may be the government of Japan, which leverages the remembered suffering of the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to burnish its disarmament credentials while secretly lobbying the United States to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in East Asia.
China
The only other country approaching this level of nuclear hypocrisy may be China, which offered the conference a scathing condemnation of several Japanese behaviors that are not all that different than their own. It claimed Japan is reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from its nuclear energy program and stockpiling the separated plutonium for military purposes. At the same time Chinese officials refuse to address US claims China is using its civilian nuclear energy program to manufacture the plutonium it will need to fill hundreds of new silos with nuclear-armed missiles. China accused the Japanese government of “ramping up its military spending for 14 consecutive years” while it has been doing the same for twice as long. It called upon the international community to insist on “open, transparent and effective measures” to monitor Japan’s nuclear energy program, while at the same time refusing to comment on why it stopped reporting the amount of civilian plutonium China is producing to the IAEA.
China associates itself with an emerging “global majority” of developing nations who seek to rebalance long-standing inequities in the international order. As China’s economic and political influence continues to grow, many nations, including other members of this “global majority,” justifiably wonder what kind of partner China will become. The Chinese government claims it will never seek hegemony, but it’s attitude towards nuclear weapons undercuts that claim. How can there be economic and political equity between a nuclear have and nuclear have nots? What is China saying to the world when it condemns the nuclear energy program of a non-nuclear weapons state – a nuclear energy program exactly like its own – while simultaneously increasing the size and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal?
The nongovernmental
Alongside the official deliberations, concerned civic organizations from all over the world hold events and activities they hope will contribute to a constructive outcome. These often take the form of stern reminders to member states of their treaty obligations, dire warnings of the potential consequences of failing to meet those obligations, and advice on how to succeed. While well-intended, it is difficult to argue, after so many decades, that these reminders, warnings and advice have had any impact.
What may be more important is that these nongovernmental organizations observe and record what happens with a great deal more objectivity and honesty than the participating member states. Decades from now, looking back, those reports may reveal that 2026 was the year the non-nuclear weapons states finally decided they’ve waited for nuclear justice long enough.